The Institute of Labor Economics finds that lost hours resulting from “quiet quitting”, which has interrupted the recovery of UK working hours since the pandemic, are especially attributable to younger cohorts.
The post-COVID-19 phenomenon of ‘quiet quitting’ can be understood as employees of younger generations reducing their working efforts and hours worked rather than leaving a job (Masterson 2022). This is problematic for UK economic growth, given that unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis (Papagiannaki, Giraleas, and Thanassoulis 2021). Notwithstanding, most advanced economies have experienced poor productivity over this period (Samiri and Millard 2022), so the curtailment of working hours presents a further threat to productivity. Additionally, UK labour productivity has lagged far behind similarly advanced economies (Mason et al. 2018; Crafts and Mills 2020), including in the post-COVID-19 period (ONS 2023a; Milesi-Ferretti 2021). In this study we explore the extent to which quiet quitting exists in the UK.
Given the recency of the quiet quitting phenomenon, much of the current evidence related to this phenomenum is anecdotal (Serenko 2023). An exception is concurrent research in the US led by Lee, Park, and Shin (2023) who found that US workers reduced their discretionary annual hours worked by 18 hours per year between 2019 and 2022; a period capturing the impact and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Though the contexts differ, the present study corresponds well to this US study. In pre-pandemic, post-pandemic terms, here, we see a significant drop in annual hours worked. We find that compared to the average hours worked in 2019, UK workers worked an average of 28 hours less each year in the post pandemic period between 2020 and 2022 (which was 29 hours less than the average annual hours worked in the post-financial crisis period of 2008- 2019). This was most pronounced in 2022, where workers worked an average of 36 hours (4.5 days) less than they had prior to the pandemic in 2019. Here we provide evidence of quiet quitting among UK workers, especially those in younger generational cohorts.
For our work we draw on the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS; 2007-2022; ONS 2023), and investigate the total number of hours worked per week across four generations. With the present study, evidence of quiet quitting is defined by a consistent reduction in hours worked from 2019 (Q4) to the end of the study period (2022 Q4). Analyses are demarcated by generational cohort (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; born 1997-2004], Generation Y [Millennials; born 1981-1996], Generation X [GenXers; born 1965-1980], and Baby Boomers [born 1952-1964]). We draw on these four commonly accepted categories (Appendix A; Table A1) that have shaped popular views about 3 generations (Dimock 2019), and for which differences have been proven across a variety of research methods (Lyons and Kuron 2014). Importantly, these generational categories have shaped discourse around quiet quitting; the voluntary reduction in hours worked by employees following the outbreak of COVID-19 (Lee, Park, and Shin 2023). This phenomenon was popularised by the social media platform TikTok (Masterson 2022), with it being largely attributed to GenZs (e.g., Bienasz 2022; Rieck 2022; Yang et al. 2020; Newport 2022).
Overall, our analysis reveals that actual hours worked, from the start of quiet quitting phenomenon declined in three of the four generational cohorts that were analysed (i.e., GenZs; Millennials; GenXers. The decline in working hours post-pandemic was not accompanied by a decline in wage. Specifically, all generations showed reductions in hours worked from the start of the pandemic, consistent with the perception of younger workers quiet quitting. GenZs showed the steepest reduction in working hours, down 48 hours per year in the period post-2019, while Millennials reduced their hours by 38 hours per year to work the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. GenXers and Baby Boomers also had reductions in working hours consistent with quiet quitting, but the changes were more moderate (24 hours and 14 hours per year respectively). Given the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers across 2022 (Statista 2023), this equates to an estimated 55,114.2 million discretionary hours lost to the labour market per year between 2020-2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. These results can be seen as part of a broader post-pandemic trend. Total working hours in the UK reduced following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (2019 Q4). Since then, there has been an overall decline in hours worked, driven primarily by younger generations (i.e., GenZs and Millennials). Taken together, these results show that quiet quitting is more pronounced among younger generational cohorts in the UK. Only the working hours of Baby Boomers have shown any potential rebound towards pre-pandemic levels (recovering 3 hours worked in the year between 2021-2022). In other words, quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours to pre-pandemic levels. These UK findings are consistent with US data showing a fall in annual hours worked from 2019-2022, that is especially pronounced in younger workers (Lee, Park, and Shin 2023).
This research contributes to a growing literature on generations and productivity. The role that economic factors play in creating meaningful generational differences is an area of economic, organisational, and popular interest (Levenson 2010). Economic conditions and formative events are important to shaping generational values, including work-values (Joshi et al. 2010). For example, data collected over a 30-year period in a U.S. population study showed GenXers and Millennials place a higher value on leisure time compared to their Baby Boomer predecessors at the same age (Twenge et al. 2010). The different generational patterns in hours worked postCOVID-19 suggest that the pandemic may have ignited behaviours that align with these values.
Our findings are also consistent with observed declines in work engagement and satisfaction among GenZs and younger Millennials working remotely (Harter 2022). An alternative explanation of generational value differences might view quiet quitting through a wellbeing lens. Working longer hours than desired can increase unhappiness and depression (Bell and Blanchflower 2019), especially if hours remain longer than desired for two years or more (Angrave and Charlwood 2015). Given that GenZs and Millennials were shown to place greater value on work-life balance before the COVID-19 pandemic (Sánchez-Hernández et al. 2019), the generational divergence in hours worked might equally be prompted by wellbeing values. Indeed, the relationship between 5 hours worked and productivity is not linear, especially when higher hours reduce wellbeing to the point of stress, illness, or error (Pencavel 2015).
Click here for the full report